It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

I argue that truth is relative (in the sense recently defended by some prominent analytical philosophers) by focusing on some semantic issues raised by Einstein's theory of relativity together with our ordinary attributions of truth.

We develop a general framework for forcing with coherent adequate sets on [Formula: see text] as side conditions, where [Formula: see text] is a cardinal of uncountable cofinality. We describe a class of forcing posets which we call coherent adequate type forcings. The main theorem of the paper is that any coherent adequate type forcing preserves CH. We show that there exists a forcing poset for adding a club subset of [Formula: see text] with finite conditions while preserving CH, solving (...) a problem of Friedman [Forcing with finite conditions, in Set Theory: Centre de Recerca Matemática, Barcelona, 2003–2004, Trends in Mathematics, pp. 285–295.]. (shrink)

A model of Zeno's dichotomy paradox is presented in Newtonian collision mechanics. One of several resolutions of the paradox illustrates the point that even in Newtonian ontology there is a spacetime weave. In a Newtonian system in which the base rules permit only spatial contact interactions, we find the mechanical emergence of action-at-a-distance effects.

Aus Platons Dialogen geht ein Bild der Philosophie hervor, in dem die persönliche Haltung des Gesprächspartners von grosser Bedeutung ist. Dieses Buch versucht zu zeigen, dass der Gesprächspartner immer wieder dazu ermutigt wird, eine wohlwollende Stellungnahme sowohl gegenüber den am Gespräch beteiligten Personen als auch gegenüber dem Thema der Diskussion einzunehmen, damit ein erfolgreiches Gespräch von Anfang bis Ende durchgeführt werden kann. Diese als Bedingung festgelegte Anforderung wirkt im dialektischen Gespräch selbst und wird bei den Gesprächspartnern aktualisiert. Ihre Wirkung aber (...) geht über ihre eigenen Grenzen hinaus, so dass auch der Leser dazu aufgefordert ist, eine wohlwollende Haltung einzunehmen und sich positiv zum Text zu verhalten. (shrink)

El artículo analiza desde una perspectiva fenomenológica y hermenéutica el modo originario de donación del mundo y el origen del mundo en el pensamiento de Jan Patočka posterior a 1965. Primero muestra en qué sentido tanto la donación del mundo como horizonte, cuanto los movimientos de la existencia humana, implican un vínculo esencial entre el modo originario de darse del mundo y la noción de infinito, concebido como lo indefinido e inagotable. Finalmente explicita por qué el vínculo del mundo con (...) lo infinito reposa sobre un impulso creativo divino que constituye el fundamento cosmológico de la religiosidad humana. (shrink)

El artículo analiza el concepto de mal radical de Kant y sostiene que su explicación del mal utiliza un modelo reconstructivo que niega la atribución de los modelos de adicción o del mal hábito. Se critica la tesis de la “revolución en la disposición moral fundamental”, primero, porque Kant abandona el método fenomenológico-trascen- dental y, segundo, por el carácter semipelagiano de su argumentación.

This paper suggests that an ontologically reductionist view of nature which also accepts the completeness of causality at the level of physics can support (1) the blissful transfiguration of the moral, (2) mystical release from standard ego-identification, and (3) psycho-physical transformation cultivated through meditative practice. This mystical naturalism provides the basis for a thicker, more vigorous institutional religious life, including religious life centred around meditation practices, personalist meanings, and the theology of incarnation, than current proposals for strongly naturalist religions allow.

Harry Frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. Assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit. Here, I propose the concept of argumentative bullshit and show how a speech acts account of bullshit assertions can be generalised to bullshit arguments. Argumentative bullshit, on this account, would be the production of an argument without a concern for the supporting relation between reasons and claim.

Sensitivity-type principles are prominent in epistemology. They have the promise to explain our intuitive and considered reactions to a wide range of important cases in everyday life, science and philosophy. Despite this promise, philosophers have raised a number of very serious objections to the principles. Accordingly, I propose a different type of sensitivity account which, I believe, gets around these serious objections. An important feature of the new approach is that the principle I propose need not be true. Rather, it (...) should be understood as a cognitive heuristic that tells us when something is not known—a type of doubt. A second feature is that the principle does not care about what one’s belief would be like in counter-factual situations. Instead, it cares about what the bases or causes for the belief would be like in those situations. (shrink)

The controversy over short selling has continued unabated from the introduction of modern equity trading in Amsterdam in 1610 to the present day. Nevertheless, the business ethics literature has not really addressed short selling. Short sellers not only profit from the misery of others, they also create it through their selling activities. However, they also provide a socially useful service by making prices better reflect true values, protecting other investors from purchasing overpriced securities. Short sellers can also help to provide (...) liquidity in the markets. Recently, there has been a hue and cry against so called "naked" short selling, which involves not delivering the shares that have been sold. This gives manipulators a tool for depressing stock prices and deprives purchasers of voting rights and potential stock lending revenue. Naked short selling creates ethical issues for short sellers, buyers, brokers, market makers, and regulators. Is it ethical to exploit a legal loophole that permits sellers to sell stock and delay delivering shares indefinitely? (shrink)

Philosophers promoting a version ofUniversal Self Consciousness mysticism(including Wainwright, Alston, Hick, Wilber andForman) take it that their interpretations ofmysticism are consistent with currentscientific findings. However, their theorieshave been implicitly or explicitly against thecentral claim arising from science, namely, thephysical causal completeness principle. Thereis strong ground to accept physical causalcompleteness for human functioning, and theassessment of physical completeness isindependent of the phenomenology of UniversalSelf Consciousness mystical experience.Further, there is a positive account ofUniversal Self Consciousness mysticism thataccepts physical causal completeness. Such anaccount (...) is preferable to the many accounts thatboth require its denial and yet give nobasically satisfactory evidence to ground thatdenial. (shrink)

According to Ramsey (Representation reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2007 ), only classical cognitive science, with the related notions of input–output and structural representations, meets the job description challenge (the challenge to show that a certain structure or process serves a representational role at the subpersonal level). By contrast, connectionism and other nonclassical models, insofar as they exploit receptor and tacit notions of representation, are not genuinely representational. As a result, Ramsey submits, cognitive science is taking a U-turn from (...) representationalism back to behaviourism, thus presupposing that (1) the emergence of cognitivism capitalized on the concept of representation, and that (2) the materialization of nonclassical cognitive science involves a return to some form of pre-cognitivist behaviourism. We argue against both (1) and (2), by questioning Ramsey’s divide between classical and representational, versus nonclassical and nonrepresentational, cognitive models. For, firstly, connectionist and other nonclassical accounts have the resources to exploit the notion of a structural isomorphism, like classical accounts (the beefing-up strategy); and, secondly, insofar as input–output and structural representations refer to a cognitive agent, classical explanations fail to meet the job description challenge (the deflationary strategy). Both strategies work independently of each other: if the deflationary strategy succeeds, contra (1), cognitivism has failed to capitalize on the relevant concept of representation; if the beefing-up strategy is sound, contra (2), the return to a pre-cognitivist era cancels out. (shrink)